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Cash-flow taxes have been advocated  as efficient, equitable, and
easy to administer. In principle, at least, they do not distort sav-
ings and investment decisions. But what are the praztical impli-
cations of the many versions of cash-flow taxation?
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Under cash-flow taxation, a country can tax the  In addition, cash flow rates may varv:
cash flow of domestic produccrs, domestic rcsi-
dents, or domestic citizens. Thc implications are  *  As a result of a  progressive rate scheduic.
different in each case.
- According to the type of taxpayer.
The paper cxamincs the positive and norma-
tive effects of various versions of a cash-flow  *  Over time, depending on economic condi-
tax, focusing on the effects of such a tax in a  lions.
small open economy.
Substantial problems can reqult from each
A country must decide, for examplc,  type of variation.
whether investment in each typc of asset will bc
taxed based on its cash flow or will instead be  Finally, inequities can arise during the
entircly tax cxempt.  The cconomic implications  transition to a cash-flow tax.  Different inequi-
diffcr, depcnding on whether the govemment  tics arise depcnding on what tax precedes the
decides or the choicc may bc left to each tax-  cash-flow tax.  And a partial introduction of
paycr.  cash-flow taxation may opcn important arbitrage
opportunities.
This paper is a product of the Public Economics Division, Country Economics De-
partment.  Copics are available free from the World Bank,  1818 H Strect NW,
Washington DC 20433. Plcase contact Ann BhalIa, room N 10-061,  extension 60359
(22 pages).
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Roger H. Gordon
In recent  years there  has been much interest  in cash-flow and  consumption  taxes.  These
taxes  can take  many  forms,  but  in all cases the  discounted  present  value of the  tax  base
over an  individual's  lifetime equals  the discounted  present  value of consumption. 1 These
taxes,  at least  in principle,  do not  distort  savings and  investment  decisions.  Many papers
have argued  that  eliminating  distortions  to savings and investment  decisions would reduce
the excess burden  created  by the tax  system.2 In addition,  Andrews(1974)  argued  that  a
cash-flow tax  would not  only be feasible  to administer  but  could even eliminate  a variety
of vexing  administrative  problems  such  as  defining  capital  gains  income.3 As  a  result
of this  support,  there  have  been several  attempts  to  explore  seriously  the  economic  and
administrative  problems of implementing  a cash-flow tax in some form, including  work by
the U.S. Treasury  in Blueprints  for Basic  Tax Reform,  by the Meade Committee  Report  in
The Structure  and Reform  of Direct  Taxation, and  by the  Brookings  Institution  in  What
Should Be  Taxed: Income  or Expenditure?.  However, there  is still very little  experience  in
practice  with  cash-flow taxes.
The  objective  of this  paper  is to  try  to  think  through  again  the  relative  merits  of a
cash-flow  tax,  focusing  on  the  effects of such  a  tax  in  a  small  open  economy.  The  first
section of the paper  examines  the implications  of optimal  tax theory  for the attractiveness
of a  cash-flow tax  in  such a  setting,  and  for the  relative  merits  of alternative  definitions
of cash-flow when  defining the tax  base.  The  second section  then  compares  the  effects of
several alternative  means of assessing a tax on a given definition of taxable  income.  Finally,
the third  section examines some transition  problems which can arise under  a cash-flow tax.
Since much has been written  about  cash-flow taxes in the past,  the emphasis in this  paper
is on issues which seem to  have been relatively  neglected  in past  studies.
1  Differences  exists, though, in the treatment of bequests given or received.
2  For second-best reasons, this cannot be true in general. See, for example, Fullerton,  Shoven, s nd
Whalley(1983)  for a claim that it is true for reasonable  parameter  values.
3  Kaldor(1955)  made similar arguments  much  earlier.
21.  Optimal  Taxation  in  a Small  Open  Economy
We focus on tax  issues in a small open  economy in order  to avoid a host  of complications
which arise when a country's  actions  can affect the commodity  prices,  the market  interest
rates,  the  real  exchange  rate,  or  the  security  prices,  that  it  faces.  When  a  country  is
large, not  only  does it have the  incentive  to  take  advantage  of its  market  power  through
tariffs  or  through  the  design  of its  domestic  tax  system,  but  it  must  also  worry  about
effects of its  decisions about  taxes  on the  equivalent  decisions  made  in other  countries.4
We examine  in  turn  the  implications  of optimal  tax  theory  for the  taxation  of domestic
investment,  the taxation  of savings by domestic  residents,  and the taxation  of labor income
or consumption  that  arises  domestically,  that  is received by domestic  residents,  or that  is
received by citizens of the country.
Tazatton  of Domestic  Investment
What  can  be  said  about  the  optimal  tax  rate  on  domestic  investment  in  a  small  open
economy?  Since the  supply  of capital  to the  economy  is infinitely  elastic,  Gordon(1980)
shows that  domestic  investment  should  not  be  taxed  as long  as labor  income  is taxable,
whether  or not  the  return  to  savings of domestic  residents  is taxable.  The argument  can
be  stated  simply as  follows.  Let  the  utility  of domestic  residents  depend  on  their  labor
supply, Lt, their consumption,  Ct, and government  expenditures,  Gt, in each period, for t =
1, ..., T.  Residents maximize  utility  subject  to  the budget  constraint  that5 t  wtnLt/(l  +
rn)t =  ,t  Ct/(1  +  rn)t,  where  rn is the  net  of tax  rate  of  return  earned  by  domestic
residents  on their savings and  where wn is the net of tax  wage rate  in period  t.  Individual
behavioi  is then  a function  solely of the net interest  rate  and  of the  time path  of the net-
of-tax wage rate.  If there  are N identical  individuals  in the economy, and the domestic  net
output  in period  t  is ft(Kt,  NLt),  then  the  resource constraint  for the  domestic  economy
4  These  issues  are covered  at length in the tariff literature. For an attempt to explore  some tax impli-
cations, see Feldstein-Hartman(1979)  or Gordon-Varian(1986).
5  For simplicity,  we have  assumed  that  the  real  return  to  savings  is constant  over  time,  and that  con-
sumption  is the  numeraire  in each  period.
3as a whole is
NCt + Gt  ft(Kt,NLt)-rKt
(1+rt  (1  +  r)t  s
where r  is the real market interest rate  prevailing in the world capital market.  In  the
construction of this budget constraint, capital is acquired in the international market  at
the fixed rental price r,  and any net savings in a period are invested in the international
market, perhaps in domestic capital, at this same rate r.  In this context, the government
can determine the behavior of domestic residents through setting the net wage rate  and
perhaps the net rate of return to savings. Given these choices, the government would then
want the capital stock Kt to be set so as to maximize domestic resources, which simply
involves having ft' =  r in each period. 6 Therefore, domestic investment should not  be
taxed.
This argumenb omits a variety of complicating factors, however. To begin with, foreign
owned firms may benefit from government expenditures on infrastructure.  Assume, for
example, that domestic output is ft(Kt,  NLt,  Gt). If the marginal cost of having an extra
firm make use of the infrastructure  is zero, then the only problem is taking into account
these benefits when deciding on the level of government expenditures. Extra expenditures
would make firms more anxious to locate in the country, bidding up the market clearing
wage. Optimal policy would then compare these benefits of a higher wage with the cost
of providing extra public services and domestic benefits from those extra services. Capital
investments would still not be taxed. If the firm does impose  extra costs on the government,
however, then these costs ought to be charged to the firm in the form of user fees to avoid
excessive  use of public facilities.
An additional complication arises from the agreement in many tax treaties to provide
a tax credit for foreign taxes when income from capital invested abroad is repatriated.  If,
in spite of the  credit, taxes would still be paid when foreign owners of domestic capital
repatriate  their earnings, then one might conclude that  increased domestic taxes on for-
eign capital simply result in decreased foreign taxes when the earnings are repatriated.
Therefore, domestic investment should be taxed, since the tax produces revenue but  has
6  This  argument  is closely related  to the  argument  for production  efficiency in Diamond-Mirrlees(1971).
4no effect on the amount  invested.  This  argument  is correct if earnings  must  be repatriated
each  year.  As  Hartman(1981)  originally  showed,  however,  if  income  can  be  reinvested
domestically  as long  as it  is profitable  to  do so, then  the  rate  of domestic  investment  is
determined  by the  domestic  tax  rate  on  capital  income.  Then,  by  the  above  argument,
capital  income should not be taxed.  However, if user fees are appropriate,  then  these taxes
would be  eligible for  a  tax  credit  when  profits  are  repatriated  only  if the  user  fees  fake
the form  of an  income tax.  User fees or property  taxes  would be deductible  from taxable
income  at repatriation,  but  not  eligible for a  tax  credit.  Therefore,  user  fees ought  to  be
disguised  as income  taxes.
What  about  taxes  on the pure  profits earned  by foreign owned firms?  If the  domestic
economy is still a price taker,  so that  the foreign firm will open a profitable subsidiary  only if
it gets a given return  from doing so, then the above argument  again implies that  this return
ought  to  be paid  without  taxation.  Any return  earned  above what  would be necessary  to
attract  the subsidiary  should be taxed,  since it collects revenue without  changing behavior.
If all countries  are identical  and  act  competitively,  then  tax competition  among  countries
will compete  this  tax rate  down to  zero.
A different  sort  of complication,  explored  by Doyle-Wijnbergen(1984),  involves tirne
consistency  issues.  Capital  may  be  completely  mobile  before  construction  begins,  but
completely  immobile afterwards.  As a result,  after  a firm is opened,  a country  can confis-
cate all the earnings with  no risk of the capital  leaving.7 Reputation  effects may discourage
such a  tax,  but  how much so depends  on the  future  demand  for new capital  investment
beyond  what  can be provided  out  of domestic  savings.  If, in spite of reputation  effects, it
would  be in  a country's  interests  in  the future  to  impose  such a  tax,  then  a firm should
anticipate  it and  choose not to locate in the country.  It  would be in the country's  interests
to commit  itself not  to impose  such a tax  in the future,  but  it may have no credible way
of doing this.  What  Doyle-Wijnbergen(1984)  proposed  as a solution  is to have the govern-
ment  pay the firm on arrival  the present value of taxes that  it will end up imposing on the
firm in  the future  to induce  the  firm to  enter.  But  this  response  produces  a time  pattern
7  Of course,  successful  operation  of  the  firm  may  require  trained  foreign personnel  who could  leave  if
such  a tax  is imposed.  Also, the  firm  might  be sabotaged,  discouraging  confiscation.
5of taxes  remarkably  like what  would happen  under  a cash-flow tax  with expensing  of new
investment.  The  initial  tax  rate  would be  set  equal to  the  tax  rate  that  the  government
would find itself tempted  to impose on the firm in the future.
Taxation  of Domestic  Savings
In the above model,  the optimal  tax  system  could well involve taxation  (or subsidization)
of the  return  to  savings.8 A variety  of papers  have argued,  however,  that  for reasonable
parameter  values the  second-best  tax  system  would have  little  taxation  of savings.  For
example,  Sandrmo(1974) shows  that  if the  utility  function  is  weakly  separable  between
consumption  and  labor,  and  if the  function  is homogeneous  in the  vector of consumption
quantities,  then the optimal  tax system  would not tax the return  to savings.  Writers  differ
on whether  taxation  of savings might be justified  on equity grounds,  and I will assume that
the  various  arguments  are well known.9 These  arguments  developed  in a closed economy
setting  carry  over directly  to  the taxation  of citizens in a small open  economy setting.
Time  consistency  issues arise here  as well, however.  A tax  on existing  asset  holdings
generates  no efficiency loss if unanticipated,  so at each date appears  attractive  if a credible
commitment  can  be  made  never  to  do  it  again.  Judd(1987)  shows  that  if  the  tax  is
anticipated  far  enough  ahead  of time,  though,  then  such  a  tax  would  be  dominated  by
a  tax  on  labor  income  for reasonable  parameter  values.  If so,  then  the  best  tax  system
would involve a precommitment  never to  tax  the return  to  capital.  While  a cash-flow tax
does not  tax the return  to capital  if the tax rate  remains  constant  over time,  a government
could  seize a fraction  of existing  assets  at  any  date  simply  by raising  the  cash-flow tax
rate.  These time  consistency  problems  would therefore  still exist  under  a cash-flow tax.
If we accept  that  the  second-best  tax on the return  to  savings is zero, then  foreign as
well as domestic  investments  made by domestic residents should not  be taxed.  A cash-flow
tax  could still be used, since in present  value it does not  tax new savings.  However, if this
8 See King(1980)  or Bradford(1980)  for  an  explicit  examination  of the conditions  describing  the  optimal
tax on savings.
9 See Bradford(1980)  for  an argument  that the equitable  tax on savings  is zero. Taxation  of bequests
raises  separate  equity  and  efficiency  issues,  and is ignored  here.
6cash-flow tax  is assessed on  firms,  a  complication  arises  with  respcet  to  the  foreign tax
credit.  Existing  tax  treaties  may  imply  that  firms  can receive a tax  credit  against  taxes
paid  abroad  when  repatriating  income under  a cash-flow tax.  If they  can expense  capital
invested  abroad  when it leaves the country,  and  then  receive a tax  credit  against  foreign
taxes when funds are repatriated,  then from a national  perspective  foreign investments  are
being  subsidized.  Similar  issues arise  under  the existing  foreign tax  credit  system  when
income rather  than cash-flow is taxed.  Irom  each country's  perspective,  foreign taxes ought
to  be deductible  rather  than  eligible fo-  credit,  while from  a world perspective  a credit
is appropriate.  Under  a cash-flow tax systcn.,  however, firms may have more flexibility to
take  cdvantage  of the system.  In particular,  if all countries  have a cash-flow tax,  then  a
firm should repatriate  income in that  year when foreign tax payments  are positive,  leading
to  a combined  net subsidy  in  present  value to  new investment.  Even though  the  present
value of taxes under  a cash-flow tax  is zero, taxes  in any one year could be  large making
this  scheme easily feasible.
Taxation of Labor Income  or Consumption
If we accept  the  various  arguments  that  have been  made  that  a  tax  system  should  not
tax  the  return  to  savings,  then  the  remaining  tax  base  is labor  income  or  consumption.
In a closed economy with  a  constant  tax  rate,  and  ignoring  bequests  and  gifts,  taxation
of labor  income  and  taxation  of consumption  at equivalent  rates  would have exactly  the
same incentive  effects and  collect exactly the  same revenue in present  value.10
With  either  tax  base,  there  are  a  variety  of ambiguities  in  the  definition  of  taxable
income which exist as well under  income taxation.  For example,  not  all payment  for work
is in  cash.  Some fringe  benefits  are often  tax exempt  by statute,  home production  is by
necessity tax exempt,  pay through  more pleasant  jobs or through  services which substitute
for consumption  is tax free, etc.  Some other problems  arise with  a labor income tax which
are avoided with  a consumption  tax.  For example,  time  spent  at portfolio  management  is
paid through  a higher rate  of return  on savings.  Similarly, entrepreneurial  effort is paid at
10  With  bequests,  the two tax  bases can still be defined appropriately  to have the same effects, as discussed
in Blu&eprints  for  Basic  Tax Reform.
7least  in  part  through  a higher  rate  of return  earned  on equity  holdings  or  a higher  sales
price  when  a  business  is sold.  Under  a  consumption  tax,  these  returns  would  be  taxed
when  the  money  is spent  on  consumption.  If the  return  on financial  assets  or business
activity  were made  tax exempt,  these forms of return  to labor  would become  tax  exempt.
However, under  a cash-flow tax which includes  cash-flow from both  portfolio  investments
and  real business investments,  the  return  to these forms of labor income  would be  taxed.
The formal argument  is not  entirely  trivial."1 Intuitively,  if the tax revenue is returned
lump-sum  to those  who pay it,  so that  there  are no redistributive  effects of the  tax,  then
the cash-flow tax creates  no income or substitution  effects for savings decisions.  Everything
else equal, real investment  decisions therefore remain  unchanged.  However, any labor effort
which is used  to  raise the  return  to savings does result  in extra  tax  payments.  Since the
revenue is returned  as a lump-sum,  there is just  a substitution  effect of the tax, discouraging
such labor  effort.
In  an  open  economy,  the  specific definition  of taxable  labor  income  or consumption
needs to be clarified further.  If taxes are based on citizenship,  then a labor income tax and
a consumption  tax are still equivalent  in present  value.  However, under  such a tax system,
while an individual's  taxes would be based solely on his citizenship,  the benefits he receives
from government  programs  would be based  in fair part  on where he lives.  Countries  with
extensive  government  programs  who tax only their  own citizens would find that  many for-
eigners would seek entrance  to take advantage  of their  extensive  government  expenditures,
particularly  foreigners from countries which base their  tax system on residence  rather  than
citizenship.  This  would  lead  to  a drain  on  government  revenues  and  therefore  to  strict
border  controls.
Even if taxes are confined to labor income and/or  consumption,  there  are several alter-
natives  to  a tax  based  on  citizenship.  A consumption  tax  could be imposed  by countries
based  on the  consumption  of residents  or based  on the  country  of origin of the  consumer
goods.  Similarly, a labor income tax could be based' on country  of residence while working.
When  labor  income  takes the form of a return  to ideas, whether  through  patent  royalties
11  The mathematical  argument  follows closely the  logic used in Gordon(1985).  The derivation  is available
from  the  author  on request.
8or through  entrepreneurial  profits,  the income could well arise in a different  country  than
the  one  where  the  individual  resides.  In this  situation,  a  tax  on  labor  income  at  origin
differs from a labor  tax based  on residence.
Most of these complications  do not arise if individuals  never migrate  between countries.
However, the  amount  of migration  to or from  n country  is often  significant.  How are  we
to  assess then  the  relative  merits  of these  alternative  tax  systems?  Economists  normally
compare  the  efficiency and  equity  implications  of the various  alternatives.
Which of these  alternative  tax  systems  would be more equitable?  The standard  theo-
retical  approach  of defining a social welfare function  leaves ambiguous  which individuals'
welfare should  be of concern?  Since only citizens  vote,  the initial  presumption  would be
that  social  welfare  would be judged  by  the  welfare of citizens.  This  means  that  foreign
residents  should be taxed  so as to maximize the welfare of citizens.  With  costless mobility
and  competition  for residents  between  otherwise  equivalent  countries,  this  would lead  to
benefit  taxation  of foreigners,  where  benefits  are measured  by the  net  value of living  in
that  country  relative  to  the best  alternative.  Taxation  of foreigners  would be  designed to
exploit  any market  power.  If mobility  is costly, the results  would not  be much different  -
exploit  existing  foreign residents  but  promise not  to exploit  potential  new residents.
Taxation  of citizens could be based  primarily  on standard  tradeoffs to  the extent  that
renunciation  of citizenship  is rare.  As always, equity  effects should  take into account  both
sides of the government  budget  - nonresidents  do not  benefit from domestic  expenditures.
so ought to pay less in taxes if they are to be treated  on net the same as otherwise equivalent
residents.  If expenditures  are perfect  substitutes  for cash  income, then  on equity  grounds
tax  payments  should  simply  fall  by  the  cost  of  these  expenditures.  If renunciation  of
citizenship  is not  unusual,  however, then  the  tax problem  becomes far more complicated,
with  extra  efficiency issues and  a less clearly defined notion of equity.
Any distortions  to  locational  decisions of citizens  will lead  to  an  efficiency loss.  The
fiscal distortion  would  arise from  the  effect of an  individual's  locational  decision  on  the
government  budget.  When a citizen migrates  elsewhere, revenue would be affected both  by
the  change in tax payments  and  by the saving in expenditures  due to the reduction  in the
9number of recipients.12 This suggests that  on efficiency grounds nonresident  citizens should
face lower taxes  than  residents  by an  amount  measuring  the  marginal  costs  of providing
government  services to  an additional  resident.  Nonresidents  would still face a benefits tax
at  their  new location,  so their  total  taxes  may still  not  change  much through  migration,
after  correcting  for  any  difference,s in  benefit  levels between  the  two countries.  What
precisely  this  reasoning  implies  for an  actual  tax  system  is not  clear  since the  reduction
in  tax  payments  for nonresidents  should  be  tied to  the  domestic  savings in expenditures,
and  how this  relates  to  economic characteristics  of the  individual  depends  on the  nature
of the expenditures.  This  reduction  should not  be tied  to foreign tax payments,  however.
However, many countries  base their tax  system primarily  on residence  rather  thani citi-
zenship,  with complicated  provisions for cases of transitory  changes in residence.  Perhaps
taxing  resident  citizens  and resident  aliens differently is viewed to  be inequitaEle.  I,I this
case, however, any deviation  of the tax  system from  a benefit  tax, reflecting  tl  -rginal
costs of providing benefits to an extra  person, creates  distortions  to the decision concerning
where to reside.  This  efficiency effect of redistribution  could well be important.  If notions
of equity are based  c . the welfare distribution  across residents,  then further  complications
arise.  A country,  for example, may find it an equity  gain to expel its  poor,  since then  the
welfare distribution  across residents would be less inequitable.
2.  Alternative  Administrative  Forms  of  Labor/Consumption  Taxes
There are a variety of ways to administer  a tax on labor income or consumption,  plus many
ways to define a tax base whose present  value equals the  present  value of consumption  or
labor  income.
Traditionally,  consumption  has been taxed through  sales taxes or a consumption-based
value-added  tax.  These  forms of tax  are easily  used if the  intent  is to  tax  consumption
of residents  at  a  uniform  tax  rate  - all that  needs  to  be  done  to  handle  international
issues is to  rebate  the tax  on goods which are exported  and impose  a tax  on all imports.
This  is what  is done  within  the  Common  Market.  If the  intent  is to  tax  citizens  rather
12  As McGuire(1974) argued in the context of n.-oility between towns, the savings in expenditures ought
to include gains from reduced congestion as well as monetary savings.
10than  residents  at  a rate  varying between  resident  and  nonresident  citizens, however,  then
these types  of taxes  work less well. There  would need to be  separate  adjustments,  at  the
individual  level, for resident  aliens and  nonresident  citizens.  This  should  still be easier  to
administer  than  having all individuals  file tax  returns,  however.
If tax rates  are to  be made  a function  of an individual's  characteristics,  however, then
there  would be no alternative  but  to impose a tax  directly on individuals.  The easiest  way
to  administer  such a tb.  is probably  through  taxing  cash-flow from  all sources, e.g.  em-
ployment,  financial  assets, and real assets, rather  than  taxing  the cash outflow used to buy
consumer  goods.  However, this  leaves open  the question  of how to treat  the nonmonetary
return  from investments  in durables  such as housing,  autos,  jewelry, paintings,  etc.  Taken
literally,  a consumption  tax would allow purchases  of these durables  to  be tax  deductible
then tax the service flows fron, these assets each year.  Doing so leads to a host  of measure-
ment  and  administrative  problems.  The  alternative  proposed  in  the  Blueprints  for  Basic
Tax Reform is to  ignore purchases  of these assets for tax  purposes,  so that  there  would be
no tax  deduction  when  the assets  are purchased  and  no  tax  on the  return.  The  present
value of the  tax  effects,  it is argued,  would be  the same  in the  two cases,  and  the  latter
approach  is far easier to  administer.  As long as the return  to  these assets  is exogenous  to
the individual's  labor  allocation  decisions, there would be no problem  with  this argument.
But  if the return  to these assets is affected by the individual's  work effort, tL.en the return
to this  work effort becomes  tax  free under  the  alternative  approach.  Certainly  much in-
dividual  effort goes into repairing  and  maintaining  houses and  cars,  and  some individuals
treat  purchases  of antiques  or paintings  as investments,  and  spend  much  effort trying  to
forecast  the  market.  Since, under  existing  taxes,  work effort within  the household  is also
tax free, these problems  are not  in any way unique  to cash-flow taxes.  Existing  taxes  do,
however, tax  the  capital  gains  from  durables,  though  with  a  large exemption  for owner-
occupied  housing.  Even this  tax  on the return  to  labor  invested  in these assets  would be
eliminated  under  a cash-flow tax.
If a labor-income  tax  is used, the main  problem is capturing  all the various  returns  to
work effort.  I have  mentioned  already  the  problem  of nonmonetary  compensation  from
a  job,  whether  in  the  form  of fringe  benefits  or  more  pleasant  conditions.  There  are
11also complicatioi-s  with  differentiating  work expenses  from consumption,  e.g.  conferences
in  vacation  spots.  These  problems  exist  as well under  the  income  tax.  I have  already
raised  the problem  of measuring  the return  to labor  allocated  to a personally  run business
or  to  managing  financial  assets.  The  same  problem  arises  in  taxing  the  return  to  the
entrepreneurial  effort used in setting  up a corporation.  Here, a cash-flow tax  can be used
to tax  the retu:rn to these forms of work effort.  There are a variety of alternative  ways that
cash-flow of a  business could be  defined,  however, as discussed  in the  Meade  Committee
report.  Let  me focus on the  taxation  of the  income of entrepreneurs  who set  up  a  new
corporation.  One  approach  would  be  to  allow expensing  of all  direct  investments  made
by  the individual  prior  to  incorporating  the  business,  and  then  make  any  cash payments
to  the  corporation  tax  deductible,  whether  in  the  form  of loans,  new  equity  purchases,
or  some other  form,  and  make  any  cash  payments  from the  corporation  taxable.  Under
this  approach,  no corporate  tax is imposed.  This  approach  is analogous to full integration
under  the personal  income tax.  If the return  to  loans is viewed not  to contain  any  return
to work effort, then  an  alternative  wou  ld be to ignore the cash flow associated  with  loans,
so that  the loan of the  principal  would  not  be  deductible  and  any  repayments,  whether
interest  or principal,  would not  be  taxable.
A variety  of other  alternatives  would  exist  in  which  some  form  of  cash-flow  tax  is
imposed  on corporations,  with  or without  a  cash-flow tax on the  entrepreneur.  As when
thinking  about  the interaction  of personal and corporate  income taxes, the intent  should be
to tax the return  to the effort of the entrepreneur  at the appropriate  tax rate,  regardless of
the form of admninistration.  If the entrepreneur  already  faces a cash-flow tax at the  appro-
priate  rate  or  the return  to the equity  inrrested in the firm, then any  tax imposed  on pure
profits  at the  corporate  level would result in a higher tax rate  imposed on entrepreneurial
effort than  is imposed  on other  forms of work effort,  so would seem inappropriate. 13 Let
me assume,  therefore,  that  there  is no cash-flow tax on the return  to equity  at the individ-
ual level." 4 The Meade Committee  report  suggested  three  alternative  forms of a corporate
13  It does  not  automatically  follow, however,  that  an  efficient tax  system  should  tax  the  income  from  all
jobs equally.
14  Under  the  proposal  in Blueprints  for  Basic  Tax Reform,  individuals  could  at  will choose to opt  out of
a tax  on  their  investments  in equity, and  in this  case  they  would choose to do so.
12cash-flow tax.  One, the R base,  would allow expensing of investments  in real capital,  then
tax any cash-flow that  results  from these investments.  A second version, the  F base,  would
in  addition  allow a deduction  for any  payments  to  lenders, whether  interest  or principal,
but  tax any new amount  loaned to the firm. Finally, the  S base would in addition  allow as
a deduction  any  cash flows to  owners of equity  in the firm, but  tax  any  inflows from  new
equity  issues.
The intent,  in comparing  these taxes, is to choose a base which taxes the true profits of
the firm, which represent  the return  to the entrepreneur's  effo:ts.  These profits  are part  of
the return  to equity holdeis.  To tax this  return,  the S base cannot  be used, since this  base
allows the payout  of these  pure  profits  to  be  deductible.  Therefore,  either  the  R or  the
F base  could be used.  If the  firm acquires  better  forecasts  about  the  future  time  path  of
interest  rates,  then it might  profit from trading  in bonds based on this  information.  These
profits  show up  under  the  F base,  but  not  under  the  R  base,  making  the  F  base  more
attractive.  If the  R base is used, there  would also be some problems  in differentiating  the
returns  to  real  vs.  financial  assets.  For example,  firms maintain  cash  reserves,  foregoing
interest,  because  of the convenience of cash holdings.  The gain may show up as increased
profits  on real  activity,  however, for example  through  smaller  payments  for shoe  leather.
Under  the  R  base,  the  return  to  these  cash  holdings  would  be  taxable,  but  the  costs
(foregone interest)  would not  be deductible.  As a second example,  both  capital  and  labor
m:ght  be used  to improve  the return  on the firm''s financial  portfolio.  Under  the  R  base,
expenditures  on these  factors  would  be deductible,  but  the  return  to  these  expenditures
would not  be taxable.
A firm can also profit from transactions  in the equity of other firms.  Any profits on such
transactions  are a component  of the return  to the entrepreneur,  so these transactions  ought
to  be  included  in  the  tax  base."5 Mergers and  acquisitions  are  a particularly  important
form of such transactions.  Since mergers and  acquisitions  can easily be  structured  to look
like either  a real  or a financial  transaction,  any  attempt  to  distinguish  between  them  for
tax  purposes  would be  untenable.
15  In  the  Meade  Committee's  classification,  this  form  of cash  flow appeared  only in the  S base.
13Other  variants  of these  taxes  might  also be proposed.  For example,  in  Blueprints  for
Basic  Tax Reform,  it  was proposed  that  individuals  have discretion  concerning  whether
they  "register"  assets when they save or not.  When  an assetX  is "registered",  contributions
are  tax  deductible  and  withdrawals  are taxable.  For "unregistered"  assets,  cash  flow in
eiiher  direction  has no tax consequences.  If all investments  earn a marginal  rate  of return,
then  the  choice has  no effect on the  present  value of taxes  paid."6 Investments  with  non-
marginal  returns  would remain  "unregistered",  however, implying  that  these nonmarginal
returns,  which  would normally  be  a form of compensation  for labor  input,  would escape
tax.
Problems  Created by a Progressive Rate Structure
Whether  a  labor-income  tax  or  a  consumption  tax  is used,  the  tax  would  normally  be
intended  to be  progressive  - if not,  a sales tax or a VAT would  probably  be far easier  to
administer.  But  once the rate  schedule is progressive, unless there  are extensive  averaging
provisions  a  host  of distortions  can  arise.  For example,  if a  labor  income  tax  is used,
then  whenever  an individual's  labor  income differs between  two years, for example before
and  after  retirement,  then  the  individual  has  an  incentive  to  change  the  timing  of labor
income  - the  same work effort in the later  year is taxed  at  a lower tax  rate.  In general,
there  would be  an incentive under  a progressive tax to  smooth  taxable  income, which can
generate  incentives to change the time pattern  of real activity  thereby  imposing additional
efficiency costs.  How severe these costs are depends  on the  volatility  of the tax  base  over
time,  and  the  flexibility the  individual  has to shift  taxable  income  across tax years.
Similar  problems  can  arise under  an  annual  income tax.  The  standard  proposal  is to
allow income  averaging.1 7 While  income averaging  could  also be  used under  a cash-flow
tax, there  would be many situations  when incomes from far distant  years would need to be
16  Even if the  asset earns  a higher rate  of retum,  the  individual  can  adjust  his investment  behavior  so as
to receive the  same  net  of tax  return  in either  case.  All that  is required  is that  if the  asset  *s "registered",
the  individual  invests the same amount  net  of taz savings initially,  which requires  a larger  gross investment
due  to the  expensing  of new investments.  In  this  case, however,  since the  gross  investment  is larger,  the
outcome  is not  the  same  in  the  aggregate.  In  particular,  the  present  value  of taxes  is higher  when  the
assets  are  "registered."
7  See Vickrey(1947)  for the  original  argument.
14averaged,  creating  problems  with  inflation accounting  and foregone interest.  For example,
under  a cash-flow corporate  tax imposed on a new firm, cash-flow would be low or negative
for the first  several years of the firm and  substantially  positive  only much later,  implying
long  delays  in  the  averaging  process.  To  solve this  problem,  the  Blueprints  for  Basic
Tax Reform  proposed  allowing  individuals  the  choice  between  investing  in  "registered"
or  "unregistered"  accounts.  J  the individual,  for example,  wanted  to reduce  his taxable
income  in  a  year,  he could  simply borrow  from  an  "unregistered"  account  and  invest  in
a  "registered"  account,  generating  a  tax  deduction  for  the  "registered"  contribution.  I
argued  above  that  this  discretion,  if unrestricted,  can  allow the  individual  to  escape  tax
on some  forms of labor  income.  However, if individuals  cannot  earn  much  by  trying  to
forecast interest  rates,  then allowing individuals  discretion  to include  only interest  bearing
assets in unregistered  accounts would still allow enough  discretion  to average incomes over
time  without  leading  to  significant  amounts  of labor  income  escaping  tax."8 If, without
these transactions,  taxable  income would be highly volatile,  then this creates  a large payoff
to financial sophistication,  and creates  a tax exempt  return  to another  form of labor effort.
Therefore,  even if this  flexibility is available,  there  is undoubtedly  still a preference  for a
tax  base which is less volatile over time.  Economic theory argues  that  consumption  should
be  reasonable  stable.  Even though  this  may not  remain  true  if purchases  of durables  are
made  tax  exempt,19 these  purchases  may be  sufficiently  infrequent  that  individuals  can
work out  the  appropriate  offsetting  transactions  between  "registered"  and  "unregistered"
accounts  without  undo  effort.
A progressive rate  structure  would also create incentives to shift taxable  income among
members  of a family,  as occurs  under  the  existing  income  tax.  In the  U.S.,  the  law has
dealt  with  these  incentives  in  a variety  of ways.  Married  couples are  normally  taxed  on
their  combined incomes,  so that  reallocation  of income between  spouses  does not  matter.
The  1986 tax reform attempted  to eliminate  any gain from transferring  taxable  income to
18  This does create the incentive to have a  "registered" account purchase a bond paying a below market
interest rate from an  "unregistered" account.  It is not clear how successful tax  administrators would be
in catching such transactions.
19 For example, if savings are withdrawn from a bank to finance the purchase of a house, this withdrawal
would be taxable if investments in housing are tax exempt, generating a large jump in taxable income.
15children  by taxing  the capital  income of a child above a low exempt  amount  at the parents'
tax  rate.  Similar  protections  would need to be built  into  a progressive  cash-flow tax.  For
example,  if gifts are treated  as tax free, then a parent  can give a child the money that  will
be  used to  make the  down-payment  on a house,  so that  when the money is withdrawn  it
would be  taxed  at  the  child's  tax  rate.  The  child could  then  make a gift of the  bouse to
the  parents.
Similarly,  varying tax  rates  create  the incentive  to  misreport  transactions  prices so as
to  shift  taxable  income  towards  the  party  facing  the  lower tax  rate.  This  has  been  of
particular  importance  for  movements  of goods  and  services within  a multinational  firm.
Whenever  tax  rates  differ between the two parties  in a transaction,  these incentives  exist,
requiring  careful  auditing  by the government.
Varying  tax  rates,  or tax  structures,  among  different  forms of organization,  e.g.  cor-
porations  vs.  partnerships,  can also create  complicated  incentives due  to  the flexibility  a
firm has  in  choosing  a legal  form  of organization.  A common  life cycle for  a firm is  to
start  as a proprietorship  or partnership  and  then,  if successful, incorporate.  What  are the
tax  implications  of this  decision  to  incorporate?  The  transition  can be  ignored  for tax
purposes,  without  creating  tax  distortions,  only if the tax  rates  and  tax  structures  faced
by the  two forms of organization  are identical.  If both  forms of organization  are subject
to cash-flow taxes  but  at  different tax rates,  then  at  the transition  date  from partnership
to  corporate  form  the  value of existing  assets  should  be  taxable  income  for the  partner-
ship  and  a tax  deduction  for the corporation.  Assessing the value of assets in an  ongoing
business would be very difficult, however.  The firm would have the incentive to exaggerate
the value if the corporate  tax rate  were higher, and conversely. If, instead,  the partnership
were  "unregistered"  while the  corporation  is subject  to  a cash-flow tax,  then  at  the  date
of incorporation  the firm should  be able  to deduct  the entire  value of its  existing  assets.
But  again  evaluating  these assets would be  extremely  difficult.
Individuals  or firms can face varying tax rates  over time  not  only due  to progressivity
in the  rate  structure  but  also due  to  legislated  changes in  the  tax  rate.  Any anticipated
change in the  tax rate  creates  an incentive to  shift real and financial  activity  over time.  If
individuals  can move funds between  "registered"  and  "unregistered"  accounts,  then  they
16would have the  incentive  to  do so until  marginal  tax  rates  are equalized  over time.  This
implies  the  possibility  of huge  fluctuations  in  tax  revenue  in  any  one  year  arising  from
anticipations  of changes  in  future  tax  rates.  Governments  may  find  it  very  difficult  to
forecast  future  revenue or  even the  present  value of future  revenue  due  to  the  resulting
volatility  in yearly  tax  payments.  This  volatility  can be  reduced  if the flexibility  to shift
assets  between  "registered"  and  "unregistered"  accounts  is eliminated.  But  then  there
would be distortions  to real decisions whenever tax rates are forecasted  to change over time,
whether  due  to  effects of a progressive  rate  structure  or due  to statutory  changes.  These
distortions  can easily be very large.  Of course,  the problems arising from statutory  changes
can be eliminated  by avoiding statutory  changes in the cash-flow tax rate,  with flucttoating
revenue  needs  handled  through  changes  in  some  other  tax.  This  loss in  flexibility  in
governrnn  n,t policy may be undesirable  for a variety  of reasons,  however.
Problems  Created by Neon.tive Taxable Income
Another  problem  with  a volatile tax base is that  taxable  income for an individual  or firm
can often  be  negative.  Should  a  tax  refund  be  made  in  this  situation?  To preserve  the
des:red incentive effects for new investmen',  the answer is clearly yes. But  allowing refunds
creates  the  incentive  to  set  up  fictitious  firms in  order  to acquire  refunds,  or perhaps  to
claim that  expensive hobbies are in fact business ventures.  Again. similar issues arise under
an  income  tax.  For example,  distinguishing  consumption  from  business  expenditures  is
present  under  both  systems.  The rule  used by the IRS in the  U.S. in this  situation  is to
require that  a business produce a profit in at least three out of five years.  The presumption
otherwise  would be  to  disallow the  deductions.  The  same monitoring  approach  might  be
used  under  a cash-flow tax,  but  this  would require  calculating  profits  as well as cash-flow
each  year.  For publicly  traded  corporations,  this  might  not  be  a  difficultly, since profit
accounts are kept anyway, but  for small businesses it may be more of a difficulty. Requiring
that  profits  be  reported  also increases substantially  the complexity  of administration.
The frequency  and timing  of negative taxable  income for businesses will depend on the
specific definition  used for taxable  income.  For a new business, under  the F base, taxable
income  will almost  surely  be  negative,  due  to  the  deductibility  of new investments  not
17financed  with  debt  issues.  Disallowing these deductions  could impose a large effective tax
rate  on  investments  in  new enterprises.  Under  this  type  of tax,  there  would  also  be  a
problem  in monitoring  payouts  during  bankruptcy.  Under  an income  tax,  these  payouts
are  normally  return  of  capital,  so  tax  exempt.  Under  a  cash-flow  tax  they  would  be
taxable,  creating  an  incentive  not  to  report  these  payouts.  Under  a  consumption  tax
at  the  individual  level, investments  in  a business  generate  lower taxable  income  only  to
the  extent  that  they  are  financed  by  reduced  consumption  rather  than  by  savings  and
borrowing.
3.  Transition  issues
Various complications  arise at the  time a cash-flow tax  is first introduced.  Large windfall
gains or losses could be created,  whose nature  would depend  critically on what  type of tax
system  preceded  the  cash-flow tax  and  what  transition  rules  were built  in.  These  large
windfalls would likely appear  inequitable,  as argued in Feldstein(1976),  and would generate
,-  ong political  opposition  to the  tax change.
For example, if an income tax  preceded a cash-flow tax, then  a newly introduced  cash-
flow tax,  without  any  transition  rules,  implicitly  taxes  away  a  fraction  of  the  value of
existing assets  - under  the income tax depreciation  deductions  would still be allowed and
the  return  of capital  would  have  been  tax  free,  but  under  a  cash-flow  tax  depreciation
stops  and  the  return  of capital  is taxable.  If existing  assets  were  made  "unregistered",
however,  to  avoid this  extra  tax,  then  they  would receive a large  windfall  gain since the
income they generate  would have been taxable  under  an income tax but  now becomes  tax
exempt.  To avoid these  windfall  effects, existing  assets  would need  to  be grandfathered,
so that  depreciation  deductions  could continue  and  so that  the return  of capital  would be
tax  free.20 These  provisions would be necessary  both  under  the individual  tax,  to protect
the  assets of the elderly, and  under  the corporate  tax.
If  the  cash-flow  tax  had  been  preceded  by  a. VAT or  a  sales  tax,  worse  transition
problems  arise.  Unless a tax deduction  is allowed at the transition  date  equal to  the value
20  Even with these  changes,  the introduction  of the new  tax could  lead to changes  in interest rates and
investment  rates which  affect  the value  of existing  assets.
18of existing  assets,  the  new  tax  will still  implicitly  seize a  fraction  of the  value  of these
existing  assets.  But  grandfathering  these assets,  to avoid a large windfall  tax  on existing
capital,  would be very difficult, since the income from these assets  as well as the return  of
capital  would need to  be exempted  from  tax.  Distinguishing  the  income  from  assets  put
in place before vs.  after  the tax change would be virtually  impossible.  The transition  loss
might  be alleviated  somewhat  by allowing depreciation  rather  than  expensing  for existing
assets,  or by postponing  the tax  change.
If existing  assets are grandfathered  in some way, then  the  tax revenue  collected  under
a  cash-flow tax  is likely to  be sharply  negative  immediately  after  the  introduction  of the
tax,  as  for example  existing  assets  continue  to  be  depreciated  but  new  investments  are
expensed.  This  creates  problems  at  the  individual  level and  at  the  aggregate  level.  In-
dividual  tax  payers  will likely find that  they  have negative  taxable  income.  Will  they  be
allowed refunds?  If so, then  the  system  may be  open  to  substantial  abuse.  If not,  then
there will be strong  incentives favoring mergers of those with  positive and negative  income,
and  favoring  other  devices to  shift  tax  losses to  those  with  taxaole  income.  However, if
allowed, individuals  would have  the  incentive  to  borrow  from  an  "unregistered"  account
and  invest  in  a  "registered"  account,  thereby  smoothing  their  taxable  income  over time,
and  alleviating  the problem  without  distorting  real activity.
At the  aggregate  level, tax  revenue may still drop  substantially  immediately  after  the
transition,  even if it does not in present value.  While in principle debt finance could be used
to  handle  the  transition,  lenders  may  legitimately  worry  about  whether  the  government
will leave  the  tax  structure  unchanged  when  taxable  income  turns  sharply  positive.  If
the  government  instead  responds  by  varying  tax  rates  over  time  to  compensate  for  the
fluctuations  in  tax  revenue,  then  this  time  variation  in  tax  rates  introduces  substantial
distortions  to  incentives,  as described  above.  If, for example,  the  rate  is set  high initially
and  allowed to decline over time  as taxable  income increases, then  new investments  will be
heavily  subsidized.  If assets  can  be  "unregistered",  then  there  may  be  substantial  shifts
in  taxable  income  towards  the  later  years,  leading  to  great  difficulty  in  forecasting  tax
revenues.
Another  type  of complication  in the  initial  transition  to  a  cash-flow tax  arises  if the
changes are not  made  simultaneously  in all areas of the tax  structure.  The U.S. in recent
19years,  for  example,  has  introduced  limited  aspects  of a  cash-flow tax  through  allowing
pension plans,  IRA's,  and Keogh accounts.  Income from a number of assets, e.g.  municipal
bonds,  owner-occupied  housing,  and  consumner durables,  is tax  free as  it would  be  if the
assets  were  "unregistered"  under  a  cash-flow  tax.  The  net  result  is  a  wide  variety  of
arbitrage  opportunities,  and  a sizeable loss in tax revenue.  In the  simplest  form, investors
can  borrow,  deducting  the  interest  payments,  and  invest  the  money  in  an  asset  whose
return  is taxed  as it would be under  a cash-flow tax, so untaxed  in present  value.  Gordon-
Slemrod(1988)  found that  at least  in 1983 the U.S. collected less revenue from the existing
tax  system  than  it would have from a pure  cash-flow tax.  Anytime  some assets  are taxed
as they  would be under  a cash-flow tax and  some assets are taxed  according  to an income
tax,  these  arbitrage  opportuLities  would arise.
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